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uct-specific support. Reporting
these payments in this way follows
the U.S. reporting of market loss
assistance payments. If this prece-
dent is followed, U.S. agricultural
support was at the limit in 1998
and exceeded the limits from 1999
to 2001.
The inclusion of the PFC and
direct payments in the reported
agricultural support has a double
impact. The U.S. reported support
actually increases by more than the
amount of the PFC and direct pay-
ments, because the other payments
that were in the non-product-spe-
cific support but were exempted by
de minimis rules must now be
counted. These other payments in-
clude the net benefits from the crop
insurance program, market loss as-
sistance payments, state credit pro-
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In early March, the World TradeOrganization (WTO) released itsreport on the U.S. appeal in the cot-
ton dispute with Brazil. The appellate
ruling upheld much of the original
ruling, including the finding that pro-
duction flexibility contract (PFC) pay-
ments and direct payments are not
Green Box measures. This means that
these payments are to be counted
against the agricultural support limit
the United States agreed to under the
current WTO Agreement on Agricul-
ture. The rulings also state that the
payments from the Step 2 program,
marketing loan program, crop insur-
ance, production flexibility contracts,
market loss assistance, and other
listed programs grant support spe-
cific to cotton and that they caused
significant price suppression in the
world cotton market.
The rulings are a major blow to
U.S. agriculture because they call
into question whether the United
States has met its obligation to limit
domestic farm subsidies. The blue
line in Figure 1 shows the agricul-
tural support limit the United States
agreed to under the current WTO
Agreement on Agriculture. The
United States has reported agricul-
tural support to the WTO through
the 2001 marketing year. The gray
line shows the reported agricultural
support before the cotton ruling. By
these original reports, the United
States has complied with the WTO
agricultural support limits. The
United States reported PFC and di-
rect payments as exempt payments.
However, the cotton rulings indicate
that the PFC and direct payments
are not exempt. This drastically
changes the U.S. agricultural sup-
port picture. Figure 1 shows how
U.S. reported agricultural support
would look if the PFC and direct
payments are counted as non-prod-
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FIGURE 1. WTO LIMITS AND REPORTED SUPPORT BEFORE AND AFTER THE
COTTON RULING
FIGURE 2. A BREAKDOWN OF U.S. AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT FOR THE
1999 MARKETING YEAR
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grams, and grazing and water subsi-
dies. For 1999, the addition of the
$5.47 billion in PFC payments turns
into a $12.88 billion increase in re-
ported support. Figure 2 shows a
breakdown of our revised estimate
of 1999 agricultural support. Mar-
keting loan benefits (through loan
deficiency payments or marketing
loan gains) account for 30 percent
of this support. PFC payments, mar-
bean farmers received such a policy
instead of current farm programs.
We calculated the Figure 3 re-
sults assuming that county revenue
guarantees are based on a $2.73
corn price and a $6.00 soybean
price. A payment was made to all
farmers in a county if the product of
the season-average price and the
yield per planted acre fell below 90
percent of the guarantee. Figure 3
shows that this new policy tool
would have avoided most of the
overcompensation of corn and soy-
bean farmers in 2004. The lower
overcompensation that occurred in
2003 results from payments being
targeted to those counties with low
yields. For corn in 2002, the new
policy would have come much
closer to hitting the revenue target
than either the current farm pro-
gram or the market-based GRIP.
WTO OUTLOOK
A GRIP-type farm program would be
classified as “Amber Box” under the
current WTO agriculture agreement
and the Doha Round framework be-
cause payments are tied to the cur-
rent price level and the farmers’
choices in planted acres. The pro-
gram could be modified to fit within
the “Blue Box” or the “Green Box.”
However, the modifications might
limit the effectiveness of the pro-
gram. The Blue Box modifications
would allow payments to be trig-
gered by price declines or regional
yield disasters, but the payments
could not change with national and/
or farm shifts in planted areas. Green
Box modifications would allow price
and/or yield reductions to trigger
payments and some updating for re-
gional shifts in crop production; but
shifts in farm production would not
be accounted for and the program
would require larger price and/or
yield declines to trigger payments.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Matching up policy tools with
policy objectives is critical for pro-
gram cost-efficiency. It is not sur-
prising that our current mix of
farm programs does a poor job of
matching program support and
market revenue shortfalls. These
programs are with us for a variety
of reasons: program inertia, oppor-
tunism concerning budget scoring,
and WTO considerations. They are
not the result of a deliberate pro-
cess of choosing program instru-
ments for their efficiency in
meeting program objectives.
Judging the 2002 Farm Bill
Continued from page 3
A more deliberate process
would reveal that our commodity
programs consist of two programs
that protect against low prices, one
program that delivers aid even
when farm income is at an all-time
high, and an ad hoc disaster system
that pays out when regional produc-
tion is low. In addition, we have a
crop insurance program that also
pays out when low yields or low
prices occur and that offers a pro-
gram, GRIP, that could easily be
modified to replace all commodity
and crop insurance programs for
major field crops.
Rationalizing commodity, disas-
ter, and crop insurance programs
by replacing them with a single-pay-
ment program based on a modifica-
tion of GRIP would increase
program transparency, eliminate
program duplication, reduce admin-
istrative costs, and largely eliminate
over- and undercompensation of
farmers. Perhaps budget pressures
will lead congressional leaders and
farm groups to take a fresh look at
the current structure of farm pro-
grams with an eye toward increas-
ing the efficiency of taxpayer
support for farm income. ◆
ket loss assistance payments, and
price support programs for dairy,
sugar, and peanuts each account
for roughly 20 percent of the sup-
port. Crop insurance represents 5
percent, while other agricultural
programs contribute the remaining
9 percent.
The end results of the cotton
dispute are still uncertain. How Con-
gress and the administration will
respond to this ruling, either in
modifying the current farm bill or in
creating the next farm bill, is un-
known. But the cotton ruling, com-
bined with the federal budget
pressures we are now seeing in the
United States, has the potential to
set off substantial changes in U.S.
agricultural policy. ◆
